

Message Text

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ACTION PM-07

INFO OCT-01 IO-15 CIAE-00 EUR-25 INR-10 L-03 NEA-10

NSAE-00 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

MBFR-04 SAJ-01 ISO-00 DODE-00 H-03 NSC-10 SS-15

ACDA-19 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01 DRC-01 /163 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7825

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

USMISSION GENEVA

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 14439

SHAPE FOR INTAF: VIENNA FOR MBFR DEL: GENEVA FOR
CSCE DEL

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, GW, UK

SUBJECT: MBFR ANGLO GERMAN CONSULTATIONS IN LONDON

BEGIN SUMMARY: FOLLOWING RECENT CONSULTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON, FRG CHIEF MBFR NEGOTIATOR BEHREND'S HAD
A FULL DAY OF CONSULTATIONS WITH BRITISH OFFICIALS
OCT 1 IN LONDON. BEHREND'S SAID THE BRITISH SEEMED TO
BE IN THE PAINFUL PROCESS OF BEGINNING TO ACCEPT THAT
AN MBFR II WOULD OCCUR. HOWEVER, HE SAID THAT LONDON'S
VIEW OF IMPLICATIONS AND DANGERS OF MBFR FOR WESTERN
EUROPEAN DEFENSES AND INTEGRATION IS MORE BLEAK THAN
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EVER. IN THIS CONNECTION, BEHREND'S SAID U.K. POSITION

ON CONSTRAINTS AND CBM TYPE PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES IS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS; THE SAME WORRIED U.K. ATTITUDE APPLIES TO MBFR NUCLEAR ASPECTS, WHICH ARE BEING COVERED BY SEPTEL. END SUMMARY

1. GENERAL. BEHRENDTS MET OCT 1 IN LONDON WITH TICKELL, WIGGIN, BRAITWAITE, GENERAL LLOYD, AND OTHER DEFENSE MINISTRY OFFICIALS FOR MBFR TOUR D'HORIZON. BEHRENDTS SAID THESE TALKS HAD BEEN ILLUMINATING FOR HIM IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT BOTH HE AND TICKELL HAD JUST CONCLUDED RECENT TALKS IN WASHINGTON.

2. MBFR-II. WHILE THE BRITISH STILL HAVE NOT CROSSED THE BRIDGE ON THIS ISSUE, BEHRENDTS SAID HE GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT THE U.K. IS MOVING TOWARD ACCEPTANCE OF MBFR-II AS A FACT OF LIFE WHICH WILL OCCUR AND WILL NOT GO AWAY. BEHRENDTS SAID LONDON CONTINUES TO VIEW AN MBFR-II WITH DEEP SKEPTICISM AND BRITISH OFFICIALS VOICED CONCERN TO HIM THAT IT WOULD INVOLVE A RACE FOR REDUCTIONS BY EUROPEAN INDIGENOUS FORCES. SOME BRITISH OFFICIALS EVEN PREDICTED IRRESISTIBLE PRESSURES WOULD GROW IN MBFR-II FOR REDUCTIONS IN BAOR; (BEHRENDTS SAID HE SERIOUSLY DOUBTED THIS LATTER POINT AS THE BAOR IS NOT AN ISSUE WITH BRITISH PUBLIC OPINION). BEHRENDTS SAID HIS BRITISH INTERLOCUTORS PARTICULARLY STRESSED INHIBITIVE TYPE DANGERS OF MBFR FOR FUTURE EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION. DESPITE THESE STRONG RESERVATIONS, HOWEVER, BEHRENDTS SAID THE BRITISH SEEMED TO BE MOVING TO THE RELUCTANT CONCLUSION THAT IT WOULD BE IN HMG INTERESTS TO KEEP THE MBFR-II PROCESS UNDER CONTROL BY COOPERATING IN PLANNING WITHIN THE ALLIANCE.

3. COMMON CEILING. HAVING BEEN AWARE OF SKEPTICAL BRITISH MBFR VIEWS PRIOR TO HIS VISIT TO LONDON, BEHRENDTS SAID HE WAS SOMEWHAT HEARTENED BY HIS TALKS. HE NOTED A FAIR DEGREE OF CONSENSUS BETWEEN THE US, U.K. AND FRG. THE U.S. AND U.K. SHARE THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING SOVIET SECRET

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AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE IN MBFR-I TO THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT; WHILE BONN STILL PREFERS TO SEEK SOVIET AGREEMENT IN MBFR-I TO THE SPECIFIC 700,000 COMMON CEILING LEVELS, BEHRENDTS ACKNOWLEDGED THE U.S./U.K. PREFERENCE FOR USING ONLY THE ILLUSTRATIVE FIGURES AND AGREED THAT THE PRINCIPLE IS MORE ESSENTIAL IN MBFR-I THAN THE PRECISE LEVELS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE NEGOTIATED IN MBFR-II.

4. CONSTRAINTS. BEHREND'S SAID THE BRITISH HAD STRONGLY EMPHASIZED THEIR VIEW THAT A GREAT DEAL OF ALLIED WORK REMAINED TO BE DONE BEFORE DEFINITIVE POSITIONS COULD BE ADOPTED IN THE AREA OF CONSTRAINTS, PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURES, VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION; BEHREND'S SAID BOTH BONN AND LONDON ARE ANXIOUSLY AWAITING FORTHCOMING U.S. PAPER ON THESE TOPICS. AS ONE EXAMPLE OF CAUTIOUS BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARD STABILIZING MEASURES, BEHREND'S

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SAID GENERAL LLOYD TOLD HIM THAT THE U.K. AND USSR

HAD NEGOTIATED AN AGREEMENT IN 1965 ON THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AT CERTAIN MILITARY EXERCISES BUT THAT THE AGREEMENT HAD NEVER BEEN IMPLEMENTED BECAUSE THE U.K. HAD DETERMINED THAT IT WOULD CREATE MORE TENSION AND DIFFICULTY THAN ADVANTAGES. LLOYD SAID THE BRITISH HAD BEEN UNWILLING TO ACCORD SOVIET OBSERVERS THE SAME ACCESS AT EXERCISES AS NATO OBSERVERS AND THE SOVIETS HAD THUS COMPLAINED OF A BREACH OF THE AGREEMENT. LLOYD SAID THIS DID NOT SUGGEST THAT LONDON WAS NECESSARILY OPPOSED TO STABILIZING MEASURES BUT RATHER THAT AN EXTREMELY CAREFUL LOOK HAD TO BE TAKEN AT ALL THE IMPLICATIONS AND THAT MUCH WORK
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REMAINED TO BE DONE ON THIS SCORE.

5. PRE-REDUCTION CONSTRAINT III. IN EXPLAINING GERMAN OPPOSITION TO PRE-REDUCTION STABILIZING MEASURE III (LIMITS ON DURATION, ETC.), BEHRENDT TOLD THE BRITISH THAT BONN CONSIDERED THIS PROPOSAL TO BE MORE IN THE NATURE OF A MEASURE TO PREVENT CIRCUMVENTION BY CAMOUFLAGED BUILD UPS. THIS WAS ONE IMPORTANT REASON WHY THE GERMANS PREFER TO TREAT THIS TOPIC IN CONNECTION WITH MBFR REDUCTIONS RATHER THAN IN THE PRE-REDUCTION FRAMEWORK.

6. GROMYKO ON MBFR. BEHRENDT SAID HE HAD LEARNED FROM THE BRITISH THAT GROMYKO TOLD DOUGLAS-HOME THAT THE SOVIETS INTENDED TO PRESENT A WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL ON REDUCTIONS IN VIENNA. GROMYKO APPARENTLY DID NOT SPECIFY THE TIMING OR HINT AT THE NATURE OF THE SOVIET PROPOSAL. BEHRENDT SAID THE FRG ASSUMED THAT THE INITIAL SOVIET PROPOSAL WOULD BE SOMETHING RATHER BROAD AND CRUDE, DESIGNED ESSENTIALLY FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES. HE THOUGHT THE SOVIETS WOULD THEN BE INCLINED TO SIT BACK, DRAW OUT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL AND SEEK TO TAKE IT APART--SLOWLY.
HILLENBRAND

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